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Notes on Articles and Contributors to this Issue of Background Information

The meaning for ecumenical social thinking of recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East deserves careful study and we hope to devote the next number of Background Information to comment on both these developments. In this number we include the remarkable article by Mr. Milovan Djilas of Yugoslavia, in which he compares the movements of de-stalinization in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. It is reported that Mr. Djilas has since been arrested and sentenced to jail for writing this article which appeared originally in the magazine The New Leader, published in New York City.

The article by Aimé Césaire is part of an address delivered at the Congress of African Artists and Writers held at the Sorbonne in Paris, in September 1956. Mr. Césaire is deputy for Martinique in the French Assembly and is also famous for his poetry and writing. It is reported that his speech at the Congress was received with great enthusiasm.

The report on "The Congress Party of India" is a condensation of a chapter in a book published by the Committee for Literature on Social Concerns in India edited by J.R. Chandran and M.M. Thomas and entitled Political Outlook in India Today. This book was published as "A Pre-election Study" for use of Christian groups in India who must, with their fellow citizens, prepare for the General Elections in India in late February.

The statement on the problems of developing the economically underdeveloped countries, by Mr. Eugene R. Black, the President of the International Bank, is taken from his annual report to the Board of Governors of the International Bank, September 1956.

Prof. Peter Kuin, the author of the article "Progressive Thought on Society and Industry", is professor of economics in Holland. His article is in fact a summary of an address which he gave at the University of Amsterdam on the occasion of his inauguration as professor of economic and industrial sociology.

I.

THE STORM IN EASTERN EUROPE

by Milovan Djilas

With the victory of national Communism in Poland, a new chapter began in the history of Communism and of the subjugated countries of Eastern Europe. With the Hungarian people's revolution, a new chapter began in the history of humanity.

These two events, each in its own way, sharply express the internal condition of the East European countries. If the events in Poland encouraged the aspirations of Communist parties - particularly those of Eastern Europe - for equality with Moscow, the Hungarian revolution made a gigantic leap and placed on the agenda the problem of freedom in Communism, that is to say, the replacement of the Communist system itself by a new social system. If the former event had encouraged both the people and certain Communist circles, the latter encouraged the popular masses and democratic tendencies.

Between the two events, although they happened almost simultaneously, there lies a whole epoch. The changes in Poland mean the triumph of national Communism, which in a different form we have already seen in Yugoslavia. The Hungarian uprising is something more, a new phenomenon, perhaps no less meaningful than the French or Russian Revolution.

Three new questions

In short, these events have brought to the fore the following new questions:

1. the further possibilities of national Communism;

2. the replacement of Communism by a new system, and, along with this, the right of a people heretofore under Communist rule to choose its own non-Communist path of development;

3. the problem of the future foreign (and, in my opinion, internal) policy of the Soviet regime.

The experience of Yugoslavia appears to testify that national Communism is incapable of transcending the boundaries of Communism as such, that is, to institute the kind of reforms that would gradually transform and lead Communism to freedom. That experience seems to indicate that national Communism can merely break from Moscow and, in its own national tempo and way, construct essentially the identical Communist system. Nothing would be more erroneous, however, than to consider these experiences of Yugoslavia applicable to all the countries of Eastern Europe.

Yugoslav resistance in 1948

Yugoslavia's resistance to Moscow in 1948 was possible, first of all, because the revolution took place in the course of the struggle against foreign occupation; in this revolution, an independent Communist country was formed, and with it a new class, the Communist bureaucracy. Not one of the Eastern European countries had this kind of a class, because their Communists received power from the hands of the Soviet regime. For this reason, a united, autonomous Communist bureaucracy could not have been formed. Therefore, there were

and still are essential differences between Yugoslav national Communism and that of the East European countries, even though their common keynote is equality with Moscow.

Yugoslav national Communism was, above all, the resistance to Moscow of the Communist party, that is, of its leaders. Not that the people opposed this resistance, not that they did not support it and benefit from it - quite the contrary. But the interests and initiative of the leaders played a crucial and leading role. The resistance of the leaders encouraged and stimulate the resistance of the masses. In Yugoslavia, therefore, the entire process was led and carefully controlled from above, and tendencies to go farther - t democracy - were relatively weak. If its revolutionary past was an asset to Yugoslavia while fighting for independence from Moscow, it became an obstacle as soon as it became necessary to move forward to political freedom.

Eastern Europe

In the countries of Eastern Europe, the reverse is true. There, Communist resistance to Moscow resulted from the discontent of the popular masses. There, from the very start, unbridled tendencies were expressed to transcend the bounds of national Communism itself. The leaders cannot everywhere control and subjugate the popular masses: therefore in some cases they try to halt any further estrangement from Moscow. That is the case, for example, in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In Bulgaria and especially in Albania, further de-Stalinization and the strengthening of national Communism have been halted only partially because of fear of Yugoslav domination, although that plays some role. Other motives were decisive: The victory of national Communism i these countries would probably have meant the beginning of the end of the exis ing system.

Yugoslavia, both as an example and through the initiative of its leaders, played an indispensable and important part at the beginning of the transition of Eastern European countries to national Communism - but only at the start. As the price of reconciliation with Belgrade, Moscow was induced to recognize verbally the equality of Yugoslavia and its "independent path" to "socialism". In that way, the deep disaffection of the East European nations received legal possibilities for expression. Limited but sanctioned protests against inequality with Moscow began to turn - and in Hungary did turn - into protest agains the system itself.

Yugoslav attitude changes

Yugoslavia supported this discontent as long as it was conducted by the Communist leaders, but turned against it - as in Hungary - as soon as it went further. Therefore, Yugoslavia abstained in the United Nations Security Council on the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary. This revealed that Yugoslav national Communism was unable in its foreign policy to depart from its narrow ideological and bureaucratic class interests, and that, furthermore, it was ready to yield even those principles of equality and non-interference in internal affairs on which all its successes in the struggle with Moscow had been based.

The Yugoslav experience has thus determined the tendency of the national Communists in both their internal and external policies - that is, it has determined the limits to which they are willing to go. But wishes are one thing and possibilities another.

Dilemma in Poland

In all this, Moscow, with its imperialist appetite, is not a passive observer but an active participant. In order to avoid an uprising in Poland and to gain time, it yielded to national Communism there. Gomulka's accession to power was not only the result of the efforts of the Polish Communists; to a larger extent, it represented a compromise between Moscow and the turbulent masses of the Polish people. Given independence from Moscow, Gomulka took a historic step forward. But with half-hearted reforms he will soon reach a dilemma - which Moscow had foreseen. He will have to choose between internal democracy, which has become inseparable from complete independence from Moscow, and the ties with Moscow required to maintain the Communists' monopoly of power. The events in Hungary have only accelerated this dilemma, which Gomulka will not be able to avoid. The victory of national Communism in Poland is not the end, but rather the beginning of further disagreements and conflicts inside the country and with Moscow.

It is difficult to say whether national Communism in Poland will choose freedom and independence rather than totalitarian rule and dependence on Moscow. But without a doubt many Communists in Poland will not hesitate to choose their own country and freedom. Knowing Gomulka, a man who is unusually honest, brave and modest, I am convinced that he himself will not long hesitate if he is confronted with such a choice.

Imre Nagy's choice

In Hungary, however, such internal conflicts are over: Not only did the so-called Stalinist set vanish, but the Communist system as such was repudiated. Moscow at first tried to cover its intervention by bringing national Communism to power through Imre Nagy. But Nagy could only install national Communism with the assistance of Soviet bayonets, and this threatened the very end of Communism. Having finally arrived at the choice between Soviet occupation and independence, Nagy courageously decided to sacrifice the Party and Communist power - which had already been crushed - for the sake of his country and freedom. Sensing Moscow's equivocal game, he asked for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, declared Hungary's neutrality, and appealed for the protection of the United Nations. His government, up to that point insignificant, became overnight the symbol of national resistance. Moscow could no longer preserve Hungarian Communism; it now faced the choice of either leaving Hungary or occupying it. Thus, its imperialism dropped its last "socialist" mask.

Had the Hungarian Revolution not only brought political democracy but also preserved social control of heavy industry and banking, it would have exercised enormous influence on all Communist countries, including the USSR. It would have demonstrated not only that totalitarianism is unnecessary as a means of protecting the workers from exploitation (i.e. in the "building of socialism"), but also that this is a mere excuse for the exploitation of the workers by bureaucracy and a new ruling class.

Party bureaucracy

Moscow fought the Hungarian Revolution not only for external but for internal reasons. Just as the Yugoslav revolt revealed Moscow's imperialism with regard to Communist countries, so the Hungarian revolution threatened to reveal the Soviet internal system as the totalitarian domination of a new exploiting class - the Party bureaucracy.

Had the Hungarian Revolution been saved from Soviet intervention, it would have been difficult indeed for Moscow to obscure its internal conflicts by means of foreign conquests and the "world mission". The Soviet system would soon have been confined to its own national boundaries, and there, too, the citizens would be forced to reflect on their position and their destiny. And not only the citizens, but the leaders. They would have to break up into different groups which could no longer carry out mutual purges within their own closed circle, but would be forced to bid for popular support. Thus, new processes would begin in the Soviet Union, too.

The attack of Israel, Britain and France on Egypt cannot permanently divert attention from the events in Eastern Europe, although it certainly encouraged the most reactionary and aggressive elements in the USSR to settle accounts with the Hungarian people. Human history is changing in Eastern Europe and that is its center today. The outmoded colonial war in the Middle East will have to be stopped.

Satellites' choice

Moscow and all the other Communist regimes, each in their own way, now face a dilemma which they never faced before. The Communist regimes of the East European countries must either begin to break away from Moscow, or else they will become even more dependent. None of these countries - not even Yugoslavia - will be able to avert this choice. In no case can the mass movement be halted, whether it follows the Yugoslav-Polish pattern, that of Hungary, or some new pattern which combines the two.

The view that the movement in Bulgaria and Rumania must be slow because of their undeveloped working classes seems dubious to me. In these countries, the peasantry is deeply nationalistic and, once the process starts, may well play a more important role than it did in Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, despite an advanced working class, no significant movement has yet emerged. But if it does, it is likely to go much farther than that of Hungary.

Moscow's dual role

Nobody can predict precisely what Moscow's ultimate course will be. At the moment, it is playing a dual role: recognizing national Communism verbally, simultaneously undermining it by not renouncing its hegemony and imperialism. Of course, the USSR falsely depicts its intervention and pressure as "aid" to and "security" for Communism as such in subjugated countries. But that plays only a minor role in its actions. Moscow's policy toward Communist countries clearly reflects a will to resist the breakup of the empire, to preserve the leading role of Soviet Communism - a will demonstrated in its efforts to use national Communism as a means and a mask for its imperialist, expansionist policies.

At the same time, however, all these actions involve Moscow not only in external strife, but in internal conflicts. One can declare with certainty that there is a split within the Soviet leadership, and that even the most reactionary and imperialist (the so-called Stalinist) group is hesitant in its actions. The influence of this group prevails today, especially in regard to the East European countries. But that does not mean that the other group is for the independence of these countries. The difference between them lies in their methods: whether to stick to the old army and police methods (Stalinist imperialist methods), or apply new ones in which economic and political elements

would be dominant. Attempts at introducing the new methods led to the Polish case, the return to the old ones led to Hungary. Both methods proved ineffective. From this spring the splits and conflicts in the USSR.

Hesitation, duplicity....

Hesitation, duplicity, ideological and political controversies, inconsistency in the use of methods, reversals of attitude, and a consistent and feverish insistence on keeping their own positions - all of these things reveal cleavages and contests among the leading group of the Soviet Union. Further changes in this group seem most plausible, and they will be of great importance both for the USSR and for the rest of the world.

There can be no doubt that the rest of the world - perhaps for the first time since the Bolsheviks took power - can directly and positively influence the direction of these changes. Despite the Soviet repression in Hungary, Moscow can only slow down the processes of change; it cannot stop them in the long run. The crisis is not only between the USSR and its neighbours, but within the Communist system as such. National Communism is itself a product of the crisis, but it is only a phase in the evolution and withering away of contemporary Communism.

The beginning of the end

It is no longer possible to stop the struggle of the people of Eastern Europe for independence, and only with great effort their struggle for freedom. These two struggles are gradually becoming one. If Moscow's imperialism suffers defeat and is prevented from war adventures, the USSR, too, will have to undergo considerable internal changes. For, just as it is compelled to be national in its forms, in essence Communism is one and the same, with the same historical origins and the same destiny. The events in one Communist country necessarily affect all other Communist countries, as in one and the same living organism. And just as Yugoslav Communism, separating itself from Moscow, initiated the crisis of Soviet imperialism, that is, the inevitable birth of national Communism, in the same way the revolution in Hungary means the beginning of the end of Communism generally.

As in all other great and decisive historic events, the Hungarian fighters for freedom, struggling for their existence and country, may not have foreseen what an epochal deed they had initiated. The world has rarely witnessed such unprecedented unity of the popular masses and such heroism. The unity of the popular masses was so strong that it appeared as though there had been no civil strife, as though a ruling class had not been wiped out overnight as if it never existed. And the heroic intoxication was so high that barehanded boys and girls were stopping the tanks of the interventionists who, like the Cossacks of Nicholas I in 1848, tried to suppress their liberty and enslave their country.

Mortal wound to communism

This event will probably not be repeated. But the Hungarian Revolution blazed a path which sooner or later other Communist countries must follow. The wound which the Hungarian Revolution inflicted on Communism can never be completely healed. All its evils and weaknesses, both as Soviet imperialism and as a definite system of suppression, had collected on the body of Hungary, and there, like festering sores, were cut out by the hands of the Hungarian people.

I do not think that the fate of the Hungarian Revolution is at all decisive for the fate of Communism and the world. World Communism now faces stormy days and insurmountable difficulties, and the peoples of Eastern Europe face heroic new struggles for freedom and independence.

II.

THE MYTH THAT COLONISATION MEANS CIVILISATION

By Aimé Césaire

(In the first part of his address Mr. Aimé Césaire recalled the diversity of negro cultures which are grouped by affinity in one great cultural family which may be called Negro-African civilisation. He then defined culture and civilisation: the work of collective will, the choice between different options, culture is the force which enables people to choose between the different options open to them; culture is the reason for which a civilisation is chosen.

"This leads us to define civilisation in terms of personality, and culture in terms of individuality ... One single economic background, one life, one passion for life, one impetus of the whole people, may contain the roots of different cultures. That does not mean that there is no determinism from basis to structure ... but the connection is never simple and must never be simplified..."

"Merely stating these definitions enables us to refute one of the myths which has been most patiently fabricated by colonisers: the myth that colonisation brings civilisation to native peoples, and awakens their culture. Some of the people who have propagated this myth have done so in good faith (for instance Victor Hugo); others are not so disinterested...")

* * * *

This brings me to my essential point: the concrete conditions in which th problem of negro cultures arises today.

This conditioning applies to the colonial, semi-colonial or para-colonial situation in which these cultures are developed. What influence can this conditioning have on the development of these cultures? And can a political statute have cultural consequences? That is not necessarily the case.

If one believes with Frobenius that civilisation is born of man's emotion in face of the cosmos, and that civilisation is only "paideuma", then politics can have no influence (or very little) on culture.

Or if one believes, like Schubart, that the primary factor is geography, if one believes that "it is the spirit of the landscape which forges the soul of peoples", then politics can have no influence (or very little) on culture.

But if one believes that civilisation is primarily a social phenomenon resulting from social facts and social forces, then it is evident that politics does influence culture.

Hegel definitely recognised this influence in his "Lessons drawn from a philosophy of History", when he wrote that innocent little phrase which Lenin must have regarded as highly important, since he quotes it and underlines it in his "Cahiers Philosophiques":

"The importance of nature must not be over-estimated nor under-estimated. Undoubtedly the gentle sky of Ionia contributed much to the grace of Homer's poems. But it cannot produce them by itself. And it still does not produce them. No bard has ever arisen under the domination of the Turks."

This can only mean one thing: that a political and social régime which suppresses the self-determination of a people destroys that people's creative power.

* * * *

This can only mean that wherever people have been colonised they have been emptied of their culture, emptied of culture of any kind.

The historic meeting at Bandung was therefore not only a great political event; it was also a cultural event of the first importance. For it was the peaceful protest of peoples who had been deprived not only of justice and dignity, but also of civilisation and culture.

We are beginning to be familiar with this process of the death of culture and civilisation under a colonial régime. Any culture requires a framework, a structure, if it is to spread. And it is certain that the elements which determine the cultural life of the colonial people disappear or deteriorate because of the colonial régime. For the political organisation which a people has established of its own free will is an important part of the culture of that people, and has an important influence on it.

And then there is the language spoken by that people. It has been said that language is "petrified psychology". If the language is no longer used officially or administratively, if it is no longer used in the schools, if it is no longer the language of ideas, it loses its status, its development is impeded, and sometimes its very existence is threatened.

We must absorb this idea. When the English destroy the political organisation of the Achantis in Nigeria, they are also dealing a blow to the Achanti culture.

When the French refuse to recognise Arabic as the official language of Algeria, or Malagasy in Madagascar, they are preventing them from developing their full potentialities under modern conditions, and thus dealing a blow to Arabic and Malagasy culture.

If the colonial civilisation is restricted, if all its expressions are suppressed or debased, how can one be surprised if that civilisation loses one of the characteristics of every living civilisation - its power of renewal?

Of course, it is the usual practice in Europe to condemn the nationalist movements in the colonial countries, representing them as if they were obscurantist forces striving to revive mediaeval forms of life and thought. But this means forgetting that every living civilisation is capable of growth and that every civilisation is alive if it expresses itself in a free society. From this point of view I consider that what is happening today in free Africa and free Asia today is highly significant. For example, now that Tunis is free, religious tribunals are suppressed - which they were not when Tunis was a colony. Now that Tunis is free, the possessions of the 'habous' are being nationalised and polygamy suppressed - which they were not when Tunis was a colony. When India belonged to Britain Indian women had to retain their traditional status. But now that India has freed itself from British rule, Indian women have become the equals of men.

Its action restricted, its dynamism shackled, the colonial civilisation enters the twilight before its fall. In his book "The Decline of the West" Spengler quotes Goethe's lines:

"Thus says Apollo, thus says the prophet:
'Give life to the form stamped upon thee
Which cannot be broken up by time, by king nor by law'".

The grave crime for which Europe must be reproached is that it has broken the spirit of civilisations which had not yet flowered, and nipped them in the bud before they could develop and fulfil themselves.

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It is unnecessary to study the whole process. Suffice it to say that the whole thing is struck at the very root, and therefore irrevocably.

One recalls Marx's description of the societies in India: "They break up and disappear to a large extent, not so much because of the brutal encroachments of the tax-gatherer and the English soldier as because of the steam-engine and the English system of free trade. The small communities are destroyed because the foreign influence destroys their economic basis." That is only too true. And it is not only true of India. Wherever Europeans have colonised, the introduction of an economic system based on money has broken up the family, destroyed or weakened the ties of tradition, and crushed the social and economic structure of the communities. If one says that, if one belongs to a colonised people the European intellectuals usually call one ungrateful, and complacently remind one what the world owes to Europe. In France the impressive picture of M. Caillois and M. Béguin is still fresh in people's memories - the former in a series of articles entitled "Illusions diametrically opposed to ours"; the latter in a preface to M. Pannikar's book on India. They review science, history, sociology, ethnography, morals, technics. What do a few unavoidable acts of violence matter in comparison with this long list of benefits?

There is certainly a lot of truth in this picture. But none of these gentlemen can prevent the fact that in the eyes of the world the great revolution which Europe has brought about in the history of humanity is <u>not</u> founded on respect for human dignity (as they endeavour to make us believe), nor on the invention of intellectual rigour; it is founded on an entirely different basis, which it would be hypocritical not to admit: Europe was the first to invent and to introduce wherever it ruled an economic and social system based on <u>money</u>, and to establish a hierarchy of values in which money was given the highest rank. Europe was the first to eliminate ruthlessly every trace of culture, philosophy and religion which might slow down or block the progress of a group of privileged peoples on their road to self-enrichment.

For some time it has been contested that the evils caused by Europe are not irreparable. It is claimed that by taking certain precautions, the devastating effects of colonisation could be palliated. Unesco has been studying this problem and recently (in the "Courrier de l'Unesco" of February 1956) its Director-General, Mr. Evans, affirmed that "under certain conditions technical progress could be introduced into a culture, in such a way as to harmonise with it". And Margaret Mead, a well-known ethnographist, also states that if one bears in mind that "every culture forms a logical and coherent whole" and that "any modification in any element of a culture produces transformations on other points", if these precautions are taken one could "introduce into a certain culture basic education, new agricultural and industrial methods, new rules for sanitary administration ... with the minimum of upheaval, or at least using the inevitable upheavals for constructive purposes".

All that is certainly steeped in good intentions. But one must make the best of it. There are not two kinds of colonisation - bad colonisation which destroys native civilisations and debases the "moral health of the colonial peoples", and good colonisation which is enlightened, based on ethnography, which tries to integrate into a harmonious whole, without risk to the "moral health of the colonial peoples", certain cultural elements from the colonising country which can beneficially be introduced into the native civilisation. One must face the facts: colonisation is never idyllic.

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As we have seen, all colonisation ends sooner or later in the death of the civilisation of the society which is colonised. But (it may be asserted), if the native civilisation dies, the coloniser substitutes for it another civilisation, which is higher than the native one - his own civilisation.

Thus the Romans are said to have killed the civilisation of Gaul, but to have brought the civilisation of Rome in its place (...)

And just as a Latin culture may have been substituted for the native culture in Gaul, in the same way (it is asserted) French, English or Spanish civilisation may be substituted for other native cultures. But that is an illusion. There never has been, and there never will be, a "new France", a "new England", or a "new Spain", as the early colonisers desired.

The diffusion of this error has not always been unconscious or disinterested. Suffice it to recall that in 1930, at a meeting of philosophers and historians devoted to the definition of the word "civilisation", a politician like M. Doumer interrupted the historian Berr or the ethnographist Mauss in order to point out the political dangers of their cultural relativism. M. Doumer told them that it was an illusion to think that it was France's mission to bring "civilisation" to her colonies (French civilisation, of course). It was an illusion, because no colonising country can ever <u>implant</u> its own civilisation on a colony.

A civilisation is a coordinated whole composed of social functions. These includes technical and intellectual functions, and functions of organisation an coordination.

Maintaining that the coloniser substitutes his civilisation on the native civilisation could only mean one thing: that the colonising nation hands over complete control of these different functions to the colony and to the natives in their own country.

Moreover, what do we learn from the history of colonisation? Just the contrary: in colonial countries technics are always developed on the fringe of the native society, so that the colonial peoples never have an opportunity to control them. (The dearth of technical instruction in all the colonial countries, the way in which the colonists refuse to grant technical qualifications to native workers - a policy which finds its most odious and thorough expression in South Africa - all this is very significant.) And as far as intellectual functions are concerned, in every single colonised country the people are illiterate and the level of public instruction low. In every colony the political power is in the hands of the colonising power and is directly exercised by the Governor or by the colonists residing there.

This explains the futility and hypocrisy of all colonial policies based on integration or assimilation. And the colonial peoples have clearly realised that such policies are a snare.

One sees the extent of the claims made by the coloniser: I sum them up by saying that exporting his civilisation to the colony would mean nothing less than deliberately building up a native capitalism a native capitalise society, which is the reflection and at the same time the competitor of the capitalism in the home country.

One need only look at the actual situation, which shows that European capitalism has never produced a native capitalism. And if no native capitalism has arisen in any colonial country (I am not speaking of the capitalism of the colons, which is a direct branch of the European capitalism), the reason is not that the natives are lazy; the reason lies in the nature and the logic of the capitalism of the colonisers.

* * * *

Malinowski formerly drew attention to a phenomenon which he called "selective giving" - a merit on his part, in spite of other things for which he may be criticised.

"The whole conception that European culture is a cornucopia - pouring forth abundance freely on every side - is completely false. One need not be a specialist in anthropology to perceive that the "European gift" is always highly selective. We never give, and we never shall give, the native peoples under our control (for this would be pure folly as long as one retains a basis of political realism) the four following elements of our culture:

1. The instruments of physical power: firearms, bombers, etc. everything which makes defence effective or aggression possible.

2. Our instruments of political control. Sovereignty always rests in the hands of the "British crown", the "Belgian crown" or the French republic. Even when we practise indirect government, that government is always exercised under our control.

3. We do not share with the natives the essentials of our wealth and of our economic advantages. The metal which comes from the African gold and copper mines is never distributed through African channels - except for the wages which are always inadequate. Even in the case of indirect exploitation like that which we practise in Western Africa or in Uganda, although we let the natives have part of the profit, the control of the economic organisation remains entirely in the hands of the Western enterprise.

4. Political equality is not granted anywhere. Nor full social equality. Nor even full religious equality. In fact, when one considers all the points that we have just enumerated, it is easy to see that there is no question of "giving" or of "generously" offering, but rather of "taking". We have deprived the Africans of their land - and usually the most fertile part of it. We have deprived the tribes of their sovereignty, and of the right to make war. We make the natives pay taxes, but they have no control (or at any rate not full control) over the administration of these funds. Lastly, the work that they do is not voluntary, except in name." (Introductory essay on the anthropology of changing African cultures, 1938).

Malinowski drew his conclusion some years later in "The Dynamics of Culture": "It is selective giving which perhaps influences the process of cultural change more than any other. What the Europeans withhold is both significant and well-determined. Their purpose is, in the process of cultural contact, to withhold all the elements which constitute the economic, political and juridical benefits of the higher culture. If the power, the wealth, and the social commodities were given to the natives, the cultural change would be relatively simple. It is the absence of these factors, our 'selective giving', which makes the cultural change so difficult and so complicated."

That is the trouble: the colonist never gives fully, and therefore his civilisation can never be bestowed on the colony; there is no question of any transfer of civilisation. In "The World and the West", Toynbee expresses a very ingenious theory concerning the psychology of impacts between civilisations. He explains that when the ray of a civilisation strikes a foreign social body, "the resistance of the foreign body refracts the cultural ray by splitting it up, just as the prism splits up a ray of light into the colours of the spectrum"; it is the resistance of the foreign social body which opposes the complete fusion of one culture in another and brings about a sort of physical selection, which only retains the least important and the most harmful elements; "in accordance with the rule that an isolated cultural element, like a contagious illness or an electron detached from the atom, may prove fatal when it is detached from the system to which it hitherto belonged and is allowed free play in a new milieu."

The truth is quite different; Malinowski is right and Toynbee is wrong. The selection of cultural elements offered to the colonists is not the outcome of a physical law. It is the consequence of a political decision, the result of a policy deliberately pursued by the colonist - a policy which may be summed up as follows: under the capitalist system, one article is never imported or exported and that is capitalism itself - I mean its bases, its virtues and its power.

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But, it will be said, one possibility remains: that of working out a new civilisation, a civilisation derived from Europe as well as from the native civilisation. Rejecting the one solution, (namely the preservation of the native civilisation) and also the other solution (that of exporting overseas the civilisation of the colonist), is it not possible to imagine a process which would lead to a new civilisation, independent of both its component parts?

That is an illusion into which many Europeans fall - for instance those Europeans in the French colonies who imagine that they are helping to bring about the birth of Anglo-African, Franco-African or Franco-Asian civilisations.

They base this belief on the idea that every civilisation lives by borrowing. And from that they infer that, since colonisation brings two different civilisations into contact with each other, the native civilisation will borrow cultural elements from the civilisation of the colonist, and that the outcome of this marriage will be a new civilisation which is hybrid.

The mistake about a theory of this kind is that it is based on the illusion that colonisation is a contact between civilisations like any other, and that everything borrowed is of equal value.

The truth is quite different. What is borrowed has value only when it is balanced by a state of mind which desires and wants it and which integrates it so that it becomes part of the body which assimilates it, thus making it internal (instead of external). Hegel's view finds its application here. When a society borrows, it takes possession of something. It is active, not passive. "By taking possession of the object, the mechanical process is transformed into an internal process, in which the individual makes the object part of himself, strips it of everything that gives it an entity of its own, turns it into a means, and imposes his own personality upon it." (Hegel, "Logic", Vol. II p.482

The case of colonisation is quite different. There is no question of borrowing because a need is felt, or of cultural elements spontaneously becoming part of the borrower. And Malinowski and his school are right in insisting that the process of cultural contact should primarily be regarded as a continuous process of interaction between groups of different cultures.

This can only mean that the colonial situation, which places the colonist and the colonial people in opposition to one another, is ultimately the determining factor here.

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What is the result?

The result of this lack of integration is the existence of a real cultural mosaic in all the colonial countries. By this I mean that in all the colonial countries the cultural features are juxtaposed, not harmonised.

And what is civilisation if it is not a harmony, a whole? Just because a culture is not simply a juxtaposition of cultural features, there could never be a hybrid culture. I do not mean that people of mixed origin will never be able to found a civilisation. I mean that the civilisation which they will found will not be a civilisation if it is hybrid. And that is why one of the characteristics of culture is style, i.e. the special mark of a people and a period which is found in every sphere where they express their activities at any period. In my view Nietzche's remarks on this subject deserve consideration. "Culture is primarily unity of artistic style in all the vital manifestations of a people. It is not an essential mark of culture to know a lot of things and to have learnt a lot - that applies best to barbarism which means lack of style, a chaotic mixture of every style."

No better description could be given of the cultural situation of every colonised country. In every country which has been colonised the harmonious synthesis which formed the native culture has been broken up, and its place has been taken by a mixture of cultural features of different origin which overlap, without, however, forming a harmonious whole. This is not the barbarism which springs from lack of culture. It is the barbarism which springs from cultural anarchy.

The word barbarism is alarming. But it should be remembered that the great creative periods have always been periods of great psychological unit, periods of communion, and that culture can only live and develop where a system of common values is maintained. On the other hand, where society is broken up into a whole medley of values which are not recognised by the community, it is bound to become decadent and sterile. Another objection is that any culture, however great, is a mixture of elements which are terrifying in their diversity.

Greek culture contains Greek elements, but also derives much from Crete, Egypt and Asia. One might even go further and affirm that culture is usually composite and wears a motley cloak. Kroeber, the American anthropologist, has interpreted this view ("Anthropology", New York, 1948):

"It is as if a rabbit could graft onto itself the digestive system of a sheep, the gills of a fish, the teeth of a cat, some of the tentacles of an octopus, an assortment of other organs taken from other specimens of the animal kingdom - and not only survive but propagate and prosper. Organically this is obviously nonsense; but it approximates very closely to what is actually happening in the sphere of culture."

It is undoubtedly true that heterogeneity is the rule here. But in a real culture, the different elements are not felt to be heterogeneous. Analysis may reveal that they are heterogeneous, but the community feels that these elements are its own, part of itself, just as much as the most typical native elements. The civilisation does not feel as if those elements were foreign bodies. For they are no longer foreign. Learned people may prove that a word or a technique is of foreign origin, but it is no use; the community has adopted the word as its own. A process of naturalisation has taken place. Foreign elements have become part of myself because I can do what I like with them, I can organise them in my universe and adapt them to my needs, because they are at my disposal, not I at theirs. But this is just what is denied to people who are colonised. Foreign elements are set down on the soil of the colony, but they remain foreign, things that belong to white people, white people's customs, things which touch the external life of the native people but over which they have no power.

But one can imagine that the colonised people can reconstitute this broken unit, that they can integrate their new experiences and their new wealth into the setting of a new unit. This will be different from the old one but it will still be a unit.

But that is impossible under the colonial régime, because a mixture of this kind can only be expected of a people if they preserve their historical initiative, in other words, if they are free - and that is incompatible with colonialism.

One will recall what was said above about the argument of need. It is true, Japan has succeeded in forming a new mixture of the traditional elements and the elements borrowed from Europe, and merging them in a new culture which is still a Japanese culture. But that is because Japan is free and has no law other than its own needs. A re-mixing of this kind demands a psychological condition, historic boldness, self-confidence. And these are the very qualities which the coloniser tries to stamp out in colonial peoples, from the very first day.

It must be realised that the famous inferiority-complex which Europeans like to ascribe to colonial peoples is not a chance. It is deliberately created by the colonist.

One of the disastrous psychological consequences of colonisation is the following: it shakes the basic concepts on which the colonised peoples could build or rebuild their world. To quote Nietzsche: "Just as earthquakes devastate and destroy cities, so that men built their homes in fear on the volcanic soil, so life itself weakens and loses courage when the basic concepts of life

begin to shake thus depriving man of all his security, his calm, his faith in everything lasting and eternal."

This phenomenen, this lack of courage in facing life, this vacillation in the will to live, has often been pointed out among colonial populations (...).

The cultural situation in the colonial countries is therefore a tragic one. Wherever colonisation occurs, the native culture begins to break up. And upon its ruins is born not a culture but a sort of sub-culture. This sub-culture is condemned to remain on the fringe of European culture; it is the culture of a small group of "élite" placed in artificial conditions with no stimulating contact with the masses or with the culture of the people, and therefore has no chance of developing into a real culture.

The result is that vast areas are created in which there is a cultural vacuum or (what amounts to the same thing) in which the culture is perverted or debased.

This is the situation which we, people of negro culture, must have the courage to face.

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And now comes the question: what should we, what can we do in face of such a situation? What ought we to do? It is clear that heavy responsibilities weigh upon our shoulders. What can we do? The problem is often summed up in the form of a choice: a choice between the native tradition and the European civilisation. We are told that we must either reject the native civilisation as childish, inadequate and obsolete; or else, in order to save our native heritage of culture, we must barricade ourselves against European civilisation and reject it. We are urged to make a choice between loyalty with backwardness on the one hand, and progress involving a complete rupture on the other.

What is our reply?

Our reply is that things are not so simple, and that this alternative is inacceptable in actual life (if not in abstract thought). Or rather that if such an alternative is assumed, it is transcended by life itself.

It is a problem which confronts all societies, not only negro ones. In every society there is always a balance which is always precarious, always changing, and which is re-established by every generation afresh, between the new and the old.

Our negro society, civilisations and cultures will not escape this rule.

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With regard to our own societies, we believe that in the African or para-African cultures of the future there will be many new elements, modern elements which may be borrowed from Europe. But we believe that many traditional elements will also remain in that culture. We refuse to yield to the temptation to make a clean sweep. We refuse to believe that the African or para-African culture of the future can reject the old African culture completely.

I believe in the future of the civilisation which has given negro sculpture to the world of art, which has given original community institutions to th

political and social world (such as village democracy, fraternal aid between the generations, or family property) which are opposed to capitalism and many other institutions which bear the hall-mark of the spirit of cooperation; the civilisation which has produced an original philosophy based on respect for life and integration in the cosmos. I refuse to believe that the renaissance of the negro peoples depends on a complete rejection of that civilisation, however inadequate it may be. I believe that our particular cultures contain enough strength, enough vitality, enough regenerative force to adapt themselves (if the conditions imposed on them are modified) to the conditions of the modern world, and that they will be able to provide valid and original solutions for all the problems - whether political, social, economic or cultural - solutions which are valid because they are original.

In our future culture there will certainly be both old and new elements. What will those new elements be? Which of the old elements will be included? That is what we don't know, and it is not for individuals to give a reply. The reply can only be given by the community. But we can at least affirm that the answer will be given, not verbally but through facts and through action.

And that is what enables us to define our own rôle, we men of negro culture. Our rôle is not to construct a plan in advance for the negro culture of the future, to predict what elements will be included in it, and which will be excluded. Our rôle is an infinitely more humble one - it is to prepare the way for those who will provide the answer: the negro peoples, freed from their shackles, with their creative genius liberated from the oppression which makes it sterile.

Today we are living in the midst of cultural chaos. Our rôle is to say: liberate the creative spirit of the people, the only thing which can turn this chaos into a new synthesis which will merit the name of culture, a synthesis which will reconcile old and new and outstrip them both. Let the negro peoples speak. Let the negro peoples enter the great stage of history.

III.

THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA

(From a book edited by J.R. Chandran & M.M. Thomas)

Historical Background

The Indian National Congress was at first an association of educated peopl who became concerned about the rising discontent against British rule in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It was organised "for constitutional agitation for concessions from the British rulers" as was said at the first session in 1885. The leaders of the movement were Liberals who believed that the British connection was "providential" and that it was the intention of the British to lead the country to a liberal form of democracy. The Congress leade offered themselves as allies in this task....

The next period in the life of the Congress saw the rise of militant Hindu nationalism under the leadership of Bala Gangadhar Tilak in Maharashtra, Aurobindo Ghosh and Bepin Chandra Pal in Bengal and Lajpat Rai in the Punjab. Against the spirit of petitioning which the Liberals followed, the new leaders asked the people to depend upon self-help and militancy. This nationalism was based on the sense of superiority of the Aryan religion and culture over the Western, and it drew its inspiration from the religious fervour which they consciously revived. For them everything in Indian society and religion was sacrosanct, and therefore they were against social reform....

This new awakening found expression in individual terrorism and was met with repression by the Government. It was Gandhiji's entry into the leadership of the Congress which made a change to non-violence in the country.

Congress cooperation in the war effort did not bring about the expected change in the attitude of the British rulers to Indian aspirations. The Montague-Chelmsford reforms did not satisfy the Congress and this was expressed in the 1918 session. The Punjab atrocities led to growing unrest in the country and it was at this time that Gandhiji came forward with his slogan of "fearlessness" and organised the Satyagraha League. The non-violent movements of non-cooperation and civil disobedience under Gandhiji's leadership in the twenties and thirties of this century gave a new kind of militancy to the national movement and brought it nearer to the masses. The Congress sessions were now held in villages. Gandhiji asked for the best part of the time and energy of the Congress for constructive work in the villages and under his inspiration the nationally inspired educated people went to the villages to do constructive work. ...

In the wave of the movements of civil disobedience and the political awakening of the masses which followed, young people began to get more and more conscious of the social and economic needs of the masses in India. Socialist thought now began to influence the educated young people. The objective of the Congress became complete independence (Purna Swaraj). ...

With the working of the 1935 Constitution, Congress ministries came to power in many of the provinces and carried the message of freedom even to the remote corners of India. When war broke out in 1939, without consultation with the popular leaders, India was declared as having entered the war and the Congress ministries resigned in protest. The Congress was prepared to join the Allies in the fight against Fascism provided they could join as equal partners.

This the British Government refused and the Congress moved towards resistance of war efforts, first by individual satyagraha and later by the Quit India Movement in 1942. With the arrest of the leaders the Congress was in the wilderness.

After the war, with the new international situation and the growing political consciousness of the people of India, the Labour Government in Britain decided to part with power, partitioning the country and leaving the Indian Dominion to a Congress ministry. Ever since, the Congress has been in power. With the Congress coming to power, it has ceased to be a national movement and has become a political party....

Ideals and Policies of the Congress

1. Unity of India

It is through the national movement that the several religious, cultural and linguistic groups in the country have attained a certain measure of national political consciousness. National unity, has, however, always remained a problem which the Congress had to wrestle with; more especially the problem of Hindu-Muslim unity. Nationalism and communalism have always been in conflict in the country. The Congress in general represented the former, the Muslim League, Hindu Maha Sabha, etc., the latter. The Congress accepted the principle of communal representation for a time to allay the fears of the non-Hindu religious minorities; but the declared policy of the Congress has always been the principle of universal personal franchise as opposed to the communal and the secular State against the religious....

With the decision of the British Government to transfer power, the Congress had to give a certain measure of practical recognition to the Muslim League's demands. It had to accept even partition for the sake of national independence.... But the Congress, under Nehru's leadership and with Gandhiji's influence, sought to stem the tide of communalism and to set up a non-communal secular State. The idea of the secular State is basic to the ideology of the Congress, because of the experience it has had with communalism.

On the problem of languages, the Congress, in laying down the fundamental rights of citizens as early as 1931, recognised the need for "the protection of culture, language and script of minorities and of different linguistic areas"... This pre-independence promise, however, was qualified when it found, as a party in power, that linguistic division would seriously affect the administrative and political unity of the country which was so essential for national development. The high-power committees appointed by the Congress after independence also recommended against immediate linguistic reorganisation. But the Congress had gone too far and it had to concede the popular demands for linguistic States. The demonstration of disruptive forces which resulted by this concession led the last Congress session at Amritsar to declare that "language cannot be the dominating factor in the demarcation of States" and that "uni-lingualism cannot be made into a fetish overriding other considerations". It recommended multi-lingual States.

2. Economic Policy

The object of the Indian National Congress as laid down in the first article of the Party's constitution is "the well-being and advancement of the people of India and the establishment in India, by peaceful and legitimate means,

of a Cooperative Commonwealth based on equality of opportunity and of political economic and social rights and aiming at world peace and fellowship....

Soon after independence the Congress defined the economic objective as "an economic structure which will yield maximum production without the creation of private monopolies and the concentration of wealth and which will create a proper balance between urban and rural economies. Such a social structure can provide an alternative to the acquisitive economy of private capitalism and the regimentation of a totalitarian State."

A social and economic system which was neither acquisitive and competitive nor regimented and totalitarian was thus evolved by the Congress as the best way towards rapid economic development, full employment, equitable distribution of the increased wealth and elimination of inequalities. On this principle, a specially appointed committee headed by Nehru drew up an economic programme which has been the basis of subsequent economic planning in the form of the first and second Five-Year Plans.

The aim of the programme is a quick and progressive rise in the standard of living of the people. There should be "opportunities for full employment which should draw out the best in each individual in the service of the community and for the highest development of his or her personality". There should an expanding volume of production. For a just social order there must be an equitable distribution of existing income. A ceiling on income was suggested at 40 times "the required national minimum", to be scalled down later to 20 times the minimum when the latter has been raised. Decentralisation was laid down as a means of diffusion of opportunities for employment.

In the agricultural sphere, all intermediaries and middlemen were to be eliminated, which meant the exit of all non-cultivating owners of land, subject of course, to certain exemptions. The maximum size of land holding was to be fixed.

The election manifesto of 1951 welcomed the appointment of a Planning Commission in keeping with the policy laid down previously. It set out a rapid abolition of zamindaries. Cooperatives would take the place of the middlemen and the farmer should receive help and instruction in better farming through various State-sponsored schemes. "It is not possible," it said, "to pursue a policy of laissez faire in industry". It had been rejected in most countries and was particularly unsuited to conditions in India. Basic industries should be "owned or controlled" by the State. "A large field of private enterprise is, however, left over." "Our economy will have a public sector, as well as a private sector. But the private sector must accept the objectives of the National Plan and fit into it", said the manifesto.

The First Five-Year Plan was in a sense an attempt to realise some of these ideals and fulfil the promises which the Congress made to the people of India...

In terms of economic ideas there have been three main streams in the Congress. First, the Sarvodaya ideal which is based on the Gandhian interpretation of village self-sufficiency. Second, the free enterprise ideal emphasising industrialisation mainly through free enterprise. And third, the socialist ideal of industrialisation with State initiative and social ownership of the means of production....

It is clear that the socialist element has gained influence. But it does not mean that the conflict of ideologies and interests has been resolved within the Party. The Congress leaders have emphasised that it is no doctrinaire socialism that the Party has adopted and that the term "socialistic pattern of society" simply gives a name to the mixture of the many threads of economic thinking which have yet to be woven into the fabric of economic idea and programme.

3. Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the Congress has also been the result of an evolutionary growth under the leadership of Nehru. It was with the rise of socialist ideas that the Congress became world-minded and expressed its commitment to world democracy in international policies. When Fascism emerged in Europe the Congress was one of the first political organisations in the world to condemn it. It also condemned the development of Japanese militarism. The Congress has been very critical of the policy of isolating Russia, which the Western European democracies followed between the wars leading to appeasement at Munich. When the Second World War broke out between the Democracies and the Fascist powers, the Congress sympathies were with the former. In the first year of the war itself, therefore, the Congress declared that it would throw "its full weight into the war effort if the British Government would declare and form a provisional National Government at the Centre". For, in its thinking, if the war was to be fought in the name of democracy, Britain had to recognise the legitimate democratic rights of India. In fact the "indivisibility of democracy" was a basic creed of the Congress.

The Constitution of the Congress declares "world peace and fellowship" as the ultimate object of the establishment of a cooperative commonwealth in India. The Congress Manifesto declared in favour of the establishment of a world federation of free nations and friendly relations with all nations particularly neighbours. India would also "champion the freedom of all subject nations and peoples for only on the basis of their freedom and the elimination of imperialism everywhere can world peace be established".

The Record of the Party ....

1. Political Consolidation

The Congress Government had to face two unexpected developments in its first days in power - the enormous movement of population across the borders from Pakistan and the invasion of Kashmir. About 4,9 00,000 of refugees came from West Pakistan and 2,600,000 from East Pakistan soon after Independence. Their rehabilitation has been completed but a recurrence of emigration from East Pakistan is presenting a fresh challenge to the statesmanship of the Congress leaders generally and of those in W. Bengal in particular....

India was declared a sovereign democratic republic, a secular democracy in which a heterogeneous society could dwell in harmony and be truly democratic. Though the concept of the secular State lends itself even now to varying shades of interpretation, it represents the ideal form of democracy a young republic like India should strive for under present conditions.

The forty million Muslims who elected to stay in India have lived with their rights unimpaired and their welfare assured under a secular democratic constitution. A significant addition which the Constituent Assembly made to

fundamental rights was the right to "propagate" one's religion. The Congress declarations on the subject since 1931 had guaranteed only the right "to profess and practise" one's religion.

The abolition of separate electorates is a pledge that the Congress has fulfilled. This with adult suffrage has assured equal rights to citizens of all religions, bringing to an end the system of communal representation in political institutions created by the Communal Award. Minorities which needed safeguards have secured them....

The consolidation of the country under a Union Government in Delhi was achieved by a process of integration of the States which redounds to the statesmanship of the late Vallabhai Patel, then Deputy Prime Minister. About 600 Princely States were persuaded to "accede" to the national government at the centre. These states were then brought under democratic constitutions. The retention of the princely rulers as constitutional heads under certain guarantees to them made for a smooth transition, though it meant an almost revolutionary change for some States with a feudalistic set-up....

2. Economic Policy

The Congress record in the economic sphere has been judged "creditable" by many foreign experts from agencies like the World Bank. The basis of economic development in the country was well laid in the First Five-Year Plan....

At the start of the Plan which involved an outlay of Rs. 20,690,000 in the public and private sectors, the country was suffering from acute shortage of essential goods, particularly food which was subject to controls. Some of it was the consequence of the World War and others part of the chronic economic problem of the country. The largest item of outlay in the First Plan was for irrigation and power, aimed at increasing agricultural production through a series of irrigation and river valley projects.

The production targets of the Plan were achieved in all but a few cases by March this year when the Plan period came to a close. Inflation has been under control in spite of deficit financing to the extent of Rs. 3,500,000. National income rose by 3 per cent per annum over the Plan period. Per capita income rose from Rs. 228 to Rs. 251. The increase in national production over the five years was 17 per cent as against the anticipated 11 per cent. The 10 per cent increase in per capita income was in spite of a population rise of 7 per cent.

The fact that the whole economy pulled itself together and that the production of food and clothing exceeded the targets has established confidence in planning as a means to rapid economic progress and in the general policy of the Congress. The mood of despair has given way to a more hopeful outlook. The moral and physical resources of the country may be said to be geared now for further efforts and more sacrifices that the Second Five-Year Plan will entail.

One of the effective means of enlisting public cooperation in economic development has been the Community Development Projects and the National Extension Service. They aim at the raising of the productivity of rural India throu State aid combined with voluntary labour of the people.

About 15 per cent of the outlay on the whole First Five-Year Plan, came in the form of foreign aid from the U.S.A., the Colombo Plan countries and loans

from the World Bank. Another important form of foreign aid from which India has benefited is the Technical Assistance Programme, under which altogether 7,159 awards for technical training for Indians and the service of 3,715 experts were received from the U.N.O., the U.S.A. and the Colombo Plan countries. The acceptance of foreign aid without strings attached has been a policy with the Congress. But foreign aid coming into the country has not been of spectacular dimensions compared to the total outlay.

Three things which the Congress Party has emphasised in all its recent declarations as essential for the well-being of Indian people are radical land reforms, full employment or expansion of employment opportunities and an equitable distribution of income. There has been a rise in the per capita income, but a substantial rise, making a visible difference in the standard of life of the people, can come only in the course of 20 or 30 years, because of the low level of per capita income in India compared to other countries. If the Plans go well, the national income would be just doubled in 20 years.

The Congress Party, however, promised a new deal for the farmer. The First Five-Year Plan outlined a comprehensive policy of land reform and management with reference to existing land interests, viz., intermediaries, large owners, small and middle owners, tenants-at-will and landless workers. The first stage, the abolition of zamindaries, is nearly complete in Andhra, Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Punjab, PEPSU, Saurashtra, Bhopal, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. But reduction of agricultural rent has not been affected in many States. In the Punjab and PEPSU, the maximum rent is still one-third of the produce, which is too high.

The Congress recognised quite early that changes in the ownership of land through the abolition of intermediaries and tenancy reforms would not by themselves solve the complexity of problems from which the farmer in India suffered and which accounted for the low agricultural production. A comprehensive programme has been needed covering irrigation, supply of fertilisers and seeds, freedom for the farmer from the money-lender and education on better methods of cultivation. Irrigation of an additional 17 million acres has been possible through projects under the First Plan. About a population of 100 million is served by the Community Development Projects and National Extension Service, resulting, among other things, in an increased use of fertilisers and better seeds. A landmark in the operation of the Plan in the agricultural sector is the report of the Rural Credit Survey Committee in December 1954 which drew attention to the need for an integrated approach to the problems of rural credit, marketing and production. Preliminary steps have been taken to implement the Committee's recommendations. The Reserve Bank of India is setting up two of the funds recommended by the Committee, the National Agricultural Credit (long term cooperative) Fund and the National Agricultural Credit (Stabilisation) Fund.

In Orissa, Punjab, Hyderabad and PEPSU, a limit has been imposed on the amount of land which a landlord can resume from his tenants, but there is no minimum fixed for each tenant. The fixing of a ceiling on existing holdings has been accepted in principle but has not been put into effect. Many aspects of the land reform policy of the Congress, such as a limit to fragmentation, remain unimplemented. The Party and the Government are aware of the need to accelerate the programme.

The policy of acquiring the rights of intermediaries on land with full compensation places a burden on the peasant in turn. The claim that the lot

of the peasant in the changed set-up has undergone a definitive improvement is open to question. The cooperative movement on which rest all hopes of organisation of agricultural production and marketing has not caught on with villagers. Cooperatives suffer from many handicaps arising chiefly out of inefficient management and local social prejudices.

The elimination of intermediaries who constitute the middle class of small landowners has given rise to problems in some areas that must be taken note of. In Rajasthan, for example, over 2,000 of these men, who call themselves Bhooswamis, have formed themselves into a movement for agitation on the plea that they are unemployed and the State is responsible for their welfare. Some of them have recently been arrested. This discontented group of middle class citizens can become an instrument in the hands of conservative and communal elements in the country.

During the First Plan period, employment opportunities did not keep pace with the demand, with the result that unemployment has been steadily on the increase. The Congress and the Government, have, however, been aware of the gravity of the situation. The AICC in 1953 itself expressed concern over the unemployment position and called for re-examination of the Plan.

The Second Five-Year Plan is designed to develop the economy further with special emphasis on industrialisation, giving priority to basic industries. It is a very ambitious one, involving an outlay of Rs. 48 million. Of this Rs. 12 million is to be found through deficit financing, the inflationary consequences of which it is difficult to foresee. About 8 million will have to be found from foreign aid and Rs. 4 million are left uncovered. It is ambitious, but such a big effort is found to be urgent in the present situation. The mood of confidence which the results of the First Plan have created may carry the nation to a substantial fulfilment of the Second Plan.

Industry and transport will take up 48 per cent of the outlay in the Second Plan, small-scale industries receiving special attention as a means of providing greater employment opportunities. But whether the jobs created under the Plan will absorb present job-seekers and future entrants (who will be about 10 million even the planners are unable to foresee with any certainty. Employment opportunities and financial resources will be two crucial tests of the Plan.

If the Plan works to schedule, there will be a 25 per cent increase in national income and an 18 per cent rise in the per capita income from Rs. 251 to Rs. 296. A balance between rural and urban development is expected to be kept up and an equitable distribution of the income produced is aimed at, with a substantial improvement in health and educational services.

The Second Plan marks a definite stage and a critical one in India's progress towards social justice and a more abundant life for the common man. It calls for efficient administration, and above all, the willing and enthusiastic cooperation of the people.

There is no doubt that the Plan is conceived in a bold manner. However, the relation between democracy and planning needs clearer thinking if planning is not to destroy the fundamental freedoms of the human person. The tensions that may develop between the different segments of the economy, the growth of State power and the dangerous potentials of deficit financing may become serious threats to the parliamentary system of government, especially in view of the weakness of the democratic tradition of the country. It is doubtful if the Government has yet taken seriously the training of administrative and technical

personnel necessary for implementing the Plan. Economic development of a feudal country within a democratic framework is unprecedented and it requires the informed support of the people to make it succeed. But whether the educational system has been geared for this purpose is doubtful.

3. Foreign Policy

It is in the foreign policy of the Government that the Congress record is most noteworthy.

The Congress Manifesto of 1951 said briefly that "in regard to foreign policy, India has pursued an independent line in her own national interest and in the interest of world peace, and sought to maintain friendly relations with all countries". Prime Minister Nehru can easily be described as the architect of India's independent foreign policy of dynamic neutrality within the framework of the United Nations Organisation. It followed logically from India's past and her present conditions. She had close relations with Britain and other Western powers and had elected to stay within the Commonwealth. These relations she maintained; and to pursue her economic policy unhindered by any external tension on her borders, she had to be on friendly terms with her big communist neighbours, China and Russia.

But as Nehru has pointed out often, this policy is not one of passive neutrality but a dynamic one. That it is dynamic is borne out by the fact that out of the policy of neutrality has been evolved the five principles, better known as Panch Shila. The principles were evolved first to govern relations between China and India after Chinese troops occupied Tibet and some understanding between the two large nations became necessary.

India's active neutrality led to the formation of a third group of nations which has had, not an inconsiderable influence in international affairs towards keeping the peace or at least in lessening tension. First these were the five countries, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia (the Colombo Powers, because of their first conference at Colombo) and later it was widened to include all the independent African and Asian nations, constituting what has been described as the Bandung community of nations.

Because of her friendly relations with communist countries and her neutral position in the Cold War between the Communist and non-Communist power blocs, India has been able to mediate successfully in the Korean war, in the conflict in Indo-China, and in persuading China to accept negotiation as a means of settling the thorny problems between her and the U.S.A., talks on which are still proceeding.

India's prestige and influence in the international sphere is out of all proportion to her material power because of the personality and genius of her Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. India's voice is listened to with respect in the U.N. Councils because of the valuable work done by her representatives like the late B. Narasinga Rao and V.K. Krishna Menon.

The Congress objectives of friendship with all nations and the building of world peace and fellowship have been successfully followed in the face of criticism from some countries where India is suspect because she has refused to align herself with one of the power blocs and is friendly with everyone.

The Kashmir dispute is the most serious problem India has in her international relations. When Kashmir was invaded by tribesmen and the Pakistan army

soon after independence, India took prompt defensive military measures. But after the ceasefire in January 1948, India stood for a settlement by peaceful negotiation and a fair plebiscite in Kashmir. During the eight years of stalemate, Kashmir has become practically integrated with India, participating fully in the political and economic life of India. Prime Minister Nehru has now stated that Pakistan's expansion of her military strength through military aid from the U.S.A. and her entry into the SEATO and the Baghdad military pacts, as well as Kashmir's political and economic development during the past eight years, have materially altered the character of the Kashmir dispute and that the necessity for a plebiscite does not exist now. Nehru has also rightly pointed out that the upsetting of the status quo now would revive all the horror and suffering of a shift of population. India's offers to Pakistan on this dispute are: demarcation of the boundaries in Kashmir on the ceasefire line and a no-war declaration with Pakistan, both aimed at peace and a permanent settlement. It must, however, be stated that Nehru has not been able to impress world opinion about the rightness of his stand on Kashmir.

India's firm stand on certain principles in her foreign policy has not been without some cost to herself. She would probably get foreign economic aid on a more spectacular scale than at present if she aligned herself alongside of one bloc of nations and signed mutual defence pacts with them. But she would then have to compromise on her principles which have won her esteem as well as influence on the side of world peace. The suspicions are waning and a policy that was once considered queer is winning more adherents to it, the latest being Ceylon. The general lessening of world tension through the operation of various factors has also borne out the Congress Government's wisdom of keeping away from military alignments.

Ideology and Leadership

It has been said that the Congress programme for the achievement of the national objectives is a non-doctrinate approach which cannot or must not be classified under any one of the known 'isms' or ideologies. Such an approach enables the Congress to have a very flexible set of ideas with which to formulate its programmes and adapt the means to the needs as it goes along.... But a political party with a programme to implement cannot be an omnibus party with an ever broadening base. With the dropping of the Socialists and the Sarvodaya enthusiasts out of the Party, the Congress did lose some of the omnibus nature of its membership. But its ideology, if it can be said to have one, reflects an ad hoc outlook which evokes the criticism that the Congress tries to be all things to all men....

Decisive action becomes difficult when a non-doctrinaire approach, which could be described also as an ideology of compromise, makes plans and policies too broad-based and unwieldy.

As long as this compromising ad hoc policy is followed in order to adjust or adapt party programmes to the national objectives and interests, there is no danger to democracy. But if it leads the Congress - and this is not an unfounded fear - to try to perpetuate itself in power by dancing to the popular tunes of the time, the Party will be working contrary to its own objectives and can actually become a menace to democracy in the country.

A danger that the Congress Party has to guard against at a more practical level is the loss of integrity of the Party now that the Party is in power. The reputation the Congress enjoys, it owes to its leaders, many of whom have

been national heroes, some of them being known and respected all over the world. While in power they and other Congressmen, who represent the people in the legislatures, are all exposed to the corrupting influence of power.... In spite of all the anti-corruption measures adopted by the Central and Provincial Governments, there are no signs of the evil having abated. Effective methods of putting down corruption are yet to be devised.

There are conservative elements in the Congress Party who hinder the formulation of liberal policies, and communal elements who endanger the secular democratic character of the Party and its programmes. The abandonment of the Hindu Code Bill, for example, by the Party in preference to a less radical and less comprehensive legislation was due no less to the pressure from within the Party than to agitation from outside. Not all leaders of the Party have the progressive outlook of Nehru and it is his towering personality and standing with the masses that compel them to subordinate their narrow aims to the broader policy of the Party....

Linguism has shown itself as another divisive factor within the Congress Party. Whereas differences are bound to exist within the Party on a big question like the reorganisation of States, the open flouting of Party objectives and mandates by important Congressmen has exposed again the conditional loyalty which some Congressmen have and the narrowness of their interests, which are primarily provincial. This may be a reflection of the mind of the area or State they come from, but it falls short of the Congress objective of national unity.

When the unity and the strength of a Party depend so much, as those of the Congress do, on the popularity and personality of a single individual, Nehru, it does not augur well for the future. The question, "After Nehru what?" takes on serious meaning in this context. The forces of conservatism and communalism may break loose after the removal of the dominant personality from the scene, join hands with the communal parties in the country and undo all the achievements since independence. The Party needs to reform itself, streamline its active membership, and discipline its ranks.

In spite of these criticisms, however serious they may be, we cannot escape the fact that there is no other party in the country which has the same stability of organisation or leadership. The commitment of the Party to the national goals, though weak in several respects, has been proved in practice. Therefore the judgment of the majority of the voters in the country may be in favour of the Congress. But the voters should see that the candidates they vote for are of unquestionable integrity and capable of bringing to the Congress a dynamic spirit of reform and commitment to the service of the people.

IV.

PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES

(From a report by Eugene R. Black)

I want to talk about the less developed countries, not just because they hold the key to the World Bank's future, but because I am convinced they will determine in large part the future of the world. I think it is clear that a great transformation is going on in these countries -- a transformation which historians may well regard as the most significant fact of the twentieth century. This transformation had its beginning more than two centuries ago, when the first western traders and colonizers set out to discover new lands and new markets. Over the decades, these traders and colonizers had a tremendous impact on the ancient societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They set in motion currents of change among people who for the most part had not experienced change for centuries. These ancient societies were rich in traditio and set in their social ways from time immemorial. The great mass of their peoples were poor in the material things of life; their economies were primitive and static. Secular nationalism was a foreign idea to most of them. But constant and increasing contact with the West and its standard of living, and with the steadily growing wonders of modern technology, aroused more and more millions to improve their traditional lot.

In the past 15 years, more than half a billion people in Asia and Africa have gained their national independence. But the fact of national independenc has not yet brought the human betterment which the people of the less develope countries so urgently need and desire. That challenge still lies ahead. And I doubt whether any group of leaders in history has faced any more difficult or exacting challenge.

Economic development is a fickle process. It creates new problems even as it solves old ones; it satisfies immediate demands only to create new and larger demands. And, most important, it destroys old attitudes toward life and work, even as it creates materials for a better life. In the less develop areas of the world today, the old stabilities are still crumbling as the minds of more and more millions are opened to new hopes and ambitions. The process of development has brought, with its benefits, turmoil and discontent which could thwart further development if not threaten the very foundations of world order.

Yet we also know that economic development is necessary for the kind of world in which people everywhere live and grow in peace. We know that the pro blems economic development creates, the turmoil and discontent, the new hopes and ambitions, can only be made manageable with more economic development. Th process must go on. It must go on steadily in the less developed countries until some new stability is achieved which is compatible with the security and welfare of people everywhere.

Let us make no mistake; economic development in these countries today is not just a process - it is also an idea, a rallying cry for more and more millions who are aroused against their traditional poverty. Here is great potential for good. If the human energy in the less developed countries can be effectively harnessed to constructive economic development, these areas can well enjoy an unprecedental rate of growth.

What is needed to make good the promise of these countries is a recognition that there are impartial, dispassionate methods of planning, organizing, and carrying out development policy - methods which provide substantial in-

surance that concrete results will be achieved and that benefits will be spread broadly among the people. If national passions can be tempered enough to give these methods a chance to work, the result in terms of world peace and prosperity is likely to be very impressive.

I think there is a growing awareness of the importance of objectivity in development policy in the less developed countries today. But a great deal more is needed, and to get it we must first clear away several myths which becloud development policy. Let me cite a few of these myths by way of example.

First there is the myth that today only governments can produce economic growth fast enough and of the right character. Let me concede at once that there may be no substitute for government in a great many instances when it comes to getting development off the ground. In most of the less developed countries the government has, and probably must have, the primary responsibility for providing basic facilities on which sustained growth can flourish. But it is a dangerous myth to believe that economic development is a matter for government alone. The great and growing reservoir of human energy in the less developed countries today cannot possibly find a constructive outlet if all decisions affecting economic growth are left to the state. The enthusiasm and potential contribution of every individual must be courted in a successful development program. And that means leaving a wide area of freedom for individuals to follow their own development initiatives and encouraging them to do so.

Then there is the myth that inflation is a handy device for making development painless. I am glad to say that I think this myth is almost ready for burial. There is a growing awareness of how inflation erodes savings, destroys the criteria for judging the soundness of investment, and plays havoc with a country's balance of payments.

But it is still difficult to find objective thinking about the practical steps needed to combat inflation. Probably the hardest decision we in the Bank have to make comes when we feel we must suspend lending to a member country because we believe inflation is undermining its credit and the vitality of its development efforts. Our action is almost bound to give rise to acute resentment. I will defend to the limit, however, the Bank's obligation to withhold support from governments which fail to deal effectively with inflation or with the threat of inflation. The myth that inflation is harmless is dying, but we still have a long way to go before it is securely laid to rest.

Finally, I would like to mention the myth that the foreign investor today is merely an up-to-date version of the old colonizers. Sometimes I think all our stereo-types of foreigners are at least 50 years out of date. We tend to believe that, while our own lives are changing, the rest of the world is standing still. This kind of myth is by no means peculiar to the less developed countries.

The facts are that today there are not, in my opinion, enough foreign investors clamouring at the gates of the less developed countries. Those who are established, or would like to be established, have changed in their attitudes and outlook just as have the people of the less developed countries themselves. Certainly, the foreign investor wants and is entitled to a fair return on his contribution. But I could point to a host of examples to prove that the return asked today is far different in amount and in character from that which the foreign investor took 50 to 100 years ago.

The danger today is not that the foreign investor will ask too much of a developing country, but that the developing countries will do too little to attract him. Today, the foreign investor cannot go into a country unless he is actually wanted by the people of the country. By indulging the myth that the private investor is trying to force an entry to engage in some sort of evil exploitation, the less developed countries are cutting themselves off from one of the most productive sources of development assistance available to them. The capital and skills which the private investor brings with him may not be available from anyone else. Particularly, he brings with him the skills of industrial management - skills which have to be seen in action to be learned. If a country is bent on industrializing and having the benefits spread broadly among the people, it can do itself no better service than to seek out the private investor abroad who is willing to risk his capital on the chance of a fair return on a successful venture.

By clearing away myths like these, the leaders of the less developed countries will be far along the road to the kind of objective attitude which is needed for sustained, healthy growth. But when I speak of the importance of objectivity in development policy, I also mean disentangling that policy from conflicting short-term political aims. We all have to live with our politics. The problem is not to insulate development from politics, but to distinguish what is good development politics from what is bad. And here my remarks apply equally to the industrialized countries and the less developed countries.

For example, no leader in a developing country can afford not to set bold development goals; he must be responsive to his people. Yet no leader of a developing country can afford to set unrealistic goals and then disrupt the whole economy by trying to achieve them. This is the road to frustration.

Similarly, in the industrialized countries political leaders have a heavy responsibility to distinguish between short-term political advantage and the real long-term interest of their countries in the economic growth of the less developed areas of the world. Despite the existence of an unprecedented flow of development assistance out of the industrialized countries today, the real self-interest of these countries is all too often obscured by a welter of short-term political and economic aims. All too often development assistance is seen merely as a means of buying diplomatic friends or military allies. As a result all too often development assistance lacks continuity and provides an inadequate basis for the advance planning of development projects.

And all too often development assistance is seen merely as a means of helping domestic manufacturers, producers, and exporters find new business. For example, I have mentioned several times on these occasions what I regard as the shortsightedness of the indiscriminate use of easy credit terms to promote exports. Business gained today on these terms is never worth the business lost tomorrow if easy credit leads to undermining the capacity of the customer to meet his foreign obligations in the future. (I might mention, too, that mortgaging future foreign exchange earnings for imports for ill-considered projects just because something is offered on credit can be a very bad bargain for the less developed countries as well.)

I think the industrialized countries would do a useful service just by drawing a clear distinction between aid for economic purposes and aid for military and other non-economic purposes. This would at least define the real area of their concern for growth in the underdeveloped world for its own sake. It is very much in the self-interest of the industrialized countries that they define this area of concern clearly. For, as I have said, a common concern with

economic development for its own sake is certainly the best hope - possibly it is the only hope - of helping the great transformation going on in the less developed countries along lines compatible with the growth and security of people everywhere.

In short, the degree of success we have with development in the less developed countries in the years ahead will be determined in large part by the success with which each country can disentangle its real interest in such development from conflicting short-term political pressures and policies.

V.

PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT ON SOCIETY AND INDUSTRY

by Dr. P. Kuin

A progressive outlook and its exponents

Progressive thought usually results from a general progressive outlook. The choice between being conservative or progressive is not primarily the result of mature deliberation. In important matters decisions are made by intuition rather than by reasoning. But reason and intuition are concepts of too limited a nature to describe the essence of a progressive outlook. To be progressive means, rather, a specific orientation of one's entire being. It is this that largely determines ethical, emotional and mental judgment. From the depths of the being there arises a tendency to look at divergent matters in one and the same light. In other words: a progressive outlook expresses itself in various aspects of life as the same basic attitude. It consists of a willing acceptance of the new, critical approach to the present and a tendency to attach little value to the past.

Such an outlook is to be expected firstly among social groups with unpleasant recollections of the past. People who have suffered privation, insecurity or oppression have no reason to glorify things that have been. Their principle is to look ahead and - especially if the present is already better than the past - they will expect more improvement still from the future.

It is the European working class which, since their awakening, have been the biggest exponents of socially progressive opinion. They too have their recollections of the bad old days - the long working hours, the endless toil, the low wages, and the insecurity. Such memories are deeply embedded in their consciousness as a class: they still determine behaviour and instinctive reactions long after the causes of the suffering themselves have been eliminated. The workers will use all their endeavours to remove the remotest chance of a reversion to the old conditions. All this is quite understandable, but the fact that the working class became a progressive force in society only after their awakening is rather remarkable. It seems that suffering and privation alone are not enough to make people progressive. Like the princess in the fairy tale they first have to be awakened out of their long sleep. They first have to be encouraged to look to the future. They must first realize their potentialities before they can develop them. This has been true not only of the working class since the industrial revolution, but it was also true of the middle-class when they freed themselves from feudal rule, and it is still true of the coloured races.

The prince who wakened the sleeping beauty had to come from outside and hack his way through a thorny hedge. The leaders at the beginning of all big emancipation movements include people who are in no need of emancipation themselves because they have come from other and more privileged environments. It is these people who point out to the underprivileged classes the reasons and the remedies for their sufferings. It is often they who have to banish apathy and arouse them to fight for a better future. The history of socialism is also that of the middle-class intellectuals who allied themselves with the workers: Keir Hardie, Jaurès and Troelstra, but also Marx and Engels, Lassalle and many of the Utopians. In an earlier age there had also been aristocrats who supported the rising middle-class in their struggle to free themselves. And going back further still we again and again find people who abandoned their position of privilege to throw in their lot with the weaker members of society.

In the sociological sense one cannot speak in this case of a class. The most such people are is a category with different class origins from the people who are emancipating themselves, who have become exceptionally important to the progressive movement. Individual psychology can undoubtedly find scope for research in helping to explain the behaviour of these leaders. Revolt against parental authority, a sense of guilt or personal frustration will play a part in some cases. But more important, perhaps, are the ordinary shocked sense of justice and that love of one's fellowmen which does not stop at charity but strives for social reform.

Besides the underprivileged and the conscience-stricken there are the intelligent critics. Throughout the ages there have been people who were progressive not so much out of sympathy for the down-trodden but out of impatience with the rulers. Young Caius Julius - later Julius Caesar - was the privileged, intelligent son of one of the foremost Roman families. Probably he joined the popular party of his day in the first place not out of pity or sympathy with the people, but because he was too intelligent and too critical to take seriously the pompous mediocrity of his fellows. The same kind of disparaging ridicule is displayed by people such as Erasmus, Voltaire, Heine, Multatuli, Kurt Tucholsky, Menno ter Braak and their kindred spirits of today. They are the sceptics, who denounce dull pomposity and self-seeking motives.

There are thus three big categories of people with progressive ideas: the socially underprivileged, the conscience-stricken and the critical intellectuals. The intellectuals are mentally the most active, not only in criticising but also in analysing the present and in thinking about the future. Yet when they join progressive movements they are often regarded as potentially unreliable, because their objective criticism or their disrespectful redicule may also be aimed at the movement's own clichés and prejudices or even at the new mandarins themselves.

The struggle for emancipation also takes place in industry, particularly among the workers. We need not go into the history of the trade union movement to prove this. But the trade unions are not the only progressive group in industry. There are progressive employers too.

They are to be found particularly among the competent people who have done well but who refuse to acquiesce in backwardness or social routine. There is a small but illustrious company in our social history. Most of them were model industrialists: Robert Owen, the Cadburys, Van Marken, C.T. Stork, Karl Zeiss - employers with a highly developed moral sense.

Others became progressive because they were independent thinkers, unimpressed by the prejudices of their day. They were critical of existing productive methods and social conditions and were on the alert for anything that provided a glimpse of the future. Walter Rathenau, who wrote "Von kommenden Dingen", was one of them; William Lever, who called his house magazine "Progress", was another. Most of them were men of deeds and not of words. Their progressive outlook lay in guiding their businesses along new paths. They were the pioneers in their industry and in their country.

The evolution of progressive thought

In Europe about the middle of the 19th century to be progressive meant in particular defending the rights of the middle class against absolutism. And also defending the rights of industry and the consumers against agrarian protectionism. Constitutional government, extension of the franchise and free trade, which were important demands of the liberal parties, were the embodiment of this progressive struggle.

Meanwhile, however, a new class had arisen: the industrial proletariat. Their vanguard demanded not only improved conditions but complete emancipation as well. The means of achieving this was to be the transformation of society. A grand vision of the future shed its light upon the struggles of those days. The unity of the human race was certain to come - as a result of the workers' struggle for freedom. The down-trodden thus became uplifted by a firm belief in their historical mission.

Since then there have been two big progressive currents, lasting nearly a hundred years, in Western society, that of the middle class and that of the working class movement. In socio-economic life and in the factories these two currents have in many ways flowed the same way. The regulations against femal and child labour and night work, the shorter working week, better wages and working conditions, the establishment of factory councils and the widening of the scope of social insurance are the chief fruits of this parallel struggle.

In recent decades the two big progressive trends - of the socially-conscious middle-class and of the working class movement - have moved closer to each other in their outlook on economic life, of course leaving the communist minority in the working class movement out of account.

There are various reasons for this. For one thing the progressive middle class are setting more store by economic planning and by a positive government approach, since the fallibility of a free economy was so harshly driven home t them in the thirties. During the second world war and shortly afterwards scar city economics, an abundance of money and the many new structural problems brought wide support for government co-ordination and incentive. At the background of this are the progress of economic science and the middle-classes' natural instinct for self-preservation.

At the same time there has also been some change in social and economic thought in the working class movement. The terrors of the Nazi dictatorship have made West European workers value more greatly the democracy we know here. A democracy has to accept the existence of people with different views and different aspirations. Firstly the workers have had to accept this in their own ranks: on the Continent many are organised in denominational unions which advocate a progressive economic and social policy but reject a fundamental change in society. Besides this the old prophecies of impoverishment of the masses have been disproved in practice. People no longer believe in the economic collapse which this would inevitably entail and which would be followed by the millennium. Moreover the theory that in the last resort wars are caus by the conflicting interests of capitalism has had to be re-examined in the light of the struggle against National Socialism and Russia's actions in Eastern Europe and Asia.

The essence of the change in the workers' attitude towards nationalisation is that they are no longer convinced that it makes much difference to them who own industry. In fact, certain actions such as strikes for higher wages or against dismissal on the grounds of redundancy become more difficult, even though from their point of view such actions might be justified.

An even deeper impression is made upon the workers by the experience - assuming they have the same rights - that they are no happier in a state industry than they are working for a private firm. The management of state industries is rather autocratic too; the worker feels he is kept in his place in the same chain of command. It is invariably the managers who decide how things have to be run and invariably the managers are chosen without consulting the workers.

The classic answer to this problem is co-management. It would take too long to discuss the evolution of this idea in all its details. Nowadays the workers hardly ever demand a share in the management of the business. At the same time joint consultation is hardly ever refused - especially on all matters affecting the workers personally. In a number of countries this development has culminated in legislation establishing industrial councils, either for whole industries or for the larger enterprises, or both.

As to the essence of present-day progressive thought on social and economic questions I think it will suffice for me to list the following points, all of which are self-explanatory:

(a) It is characterised by an urge to reduce or limit unequal distribution of the available national income among the various sections of the community;

(b) It seeks to protect the underprivileged against loss through ill health, infirmity, old age and unemployment;

(c) It demands facilities for education and promotion for people with ability from poorer families;

(d) It demands the recognition of trade unions and employees' representatives as complete partners in negotiations within the firm and also on an industrial and national level;

(e) Though perhaps to a varying degree, it recognises the positive value of the government's leading role in economic life and in coordinating the interests of various groups;

(f) It shows a readiness for international cooperation and, in Europe, for economic integration;

(g) On the whole it tends to modify the motive of profit and accentuate the motive of service, to temper individualism and to strengthen solidarity.

The progressive outlook on the future

Nowadays there is a certain languor in progressive aspirations. The causes are varied. Firstly, so much has already been achieved that emancipation seems almost complete. Secondly, the pseudo-scientific laws of Marxism have been invalidated. Thirdly, emotional attitudes are different. In earlier generations the social struggle had the glamour of idealism and high expectation. For most of the younger generation of today idealism is something outmoded and sentimental and talk about the promise of the future sounds high falutin. This is not only because of the threat of atomic warfare but also because emotional attitudes have become more matter-of-fact. Just as far as the generation of 1920 were removed from the lament of romanticism, so far are the generation of 1950 removed from the lyric of salvation.

Nevertheless the need for promise remains. In several countries passionate appeals are made for a fresh approach to the future. As compared with the old Utopians, however, the big European progressive parties' programmes seem rather anaemic. On the whole they amount to a little more equality, a little more planning, and sometimes a little more nationalisation.

The enquiring, critical minds still to be found in the progressive movement complain of lack of a sense of direction, the absence of vision regarding social developments today and tomorrow. "We are progressive, but whither are we progressing?" they ask.

This question need not remain entirely unanswered. Some elements of a new outlook exist. But perhaps the various progressive movements are too introspective to recognise them yet.

In the first place the world has been opened up to us. Everywhere, in the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Western Germany, Britain and Scandinavia, progressive movements of various shades are apt to forget that North Western Europe is one of the most privileged areas of the world. There are, of course, newer and wealthier areas, but compared with the outside world it is still faring well. It is also fairly peaceful; its social and economic problems are of limited importance as compared with the privation, disease and insecurity which again and again affect large sections of the world's population. There is no reason why a progressive spirit should not emanate from privileged areas: the 19th century produced inspiring examples of this on a smaller scale. But it is possible only if the people who live there have a sense of proportion and recognise the tremendous task awaiting them in the outside world.

The entire population, including the working class, of relatively prosperous countries, now stand in a relationship towards the coloured races similar to that in which the middle classes stood towards the industrial proletariat in the 19th century. In this situation they can be conservative and antagonistic or progressive and understanding. Their help can be purely supplementary; the actual raising of standards depends upon the efforts of the backward nations themselves. It would help as little now as it would have helped in the 19th century to share the wealth of the few among the masses of the poor, and political organisation cannot remedy economic shortage now any more than it could then. More intensive exploitation of natural resources, expansion of the productive equipment and more efficient planning of labour utilisation are still the essentials for greater prosperity. In creating harmony between the classes, obstacles arising from feelings of inferiority have been removed by recognition and consultation and this surely is also the way to a constructive world society from which undue tensions between the races have been removed. If the prosperous part of Europe makes a concerted effort to do what it can itself in this process of development and creates an understanding of this among all sections of the people, it will more easily see its own troubles in their true perspective.

In addition, the progressive West must clarify its own concept of the future if it is to develop a fresh outlook.

The choice facing progressive people in Western Europe is that between a closed, collectivist society and an open, differentiated society. Collectivism itself is not incompatible with some facets of progressive aspiration: solidarity with the underprivileged, a critical attitude towards class privilege and sympathy for economic planning.

And yet a progressive West European conscious of his cultural origins will be unable to accept collectivism. By nature it depends upon coercion. This coercion may be of a limited nature if the population differs little socially and spiritually. According as there is greater differentiation in the community more compulsion will be needed to enforce collectivism.

The West European values spiritual and social differentiation for its own sake and as a consequence he accepts a certain balance of forces and decision by consultation.

It would be an unprecedented step back for Western Europe to belief its history and abandon this differentiation. In this part of the world, therefore, collectivism means the opposite of progressiveness.

The alternative cannot be a society in which order is created only out of a fight that is free of all. We are in need of what the World Council of Churches has called "a responsible society" and our sense of responsibility must become evident in practice. But if its result is security and protection, the emphasis must lie in the social sphere. To go on protecting the inefficient is to perpetuate the waste of natural gifts and human labour. Hence, economic protection can be progressive only if it consists of temporary aid during the transition to more efficient methods of production.

A balance must be struck again and again between social security and a dynamic economy.

The open society is characterised by an uninhibited attitude both to creative activity and to the coordinating authority. The object of both is to strengthen economic power. Both must be looked at in the framework of social responsibility.

In this entire approach to the future, private enterprise plays an indispensable part. It would be making a big contribution to the clarification of progressive thought if it could discard its past prejudices on this point.

Progressive thought is still under the spell of now discredited theories, such as the concepts of surplus value, exploitation, under-consumption, the pauperization of the masses, the law of diminishing returns to capital and the imperialism to which this leads. It is time for progressive people to rid themselves of these notions and to incorporate private enterprise as a permanent and worthwhile part of our future society, the exponent "par excellence" of technical progress and economic flexibility.

This will be all the easier because social changes are taking place in private enterprise which are very important for a new progressive outlook. A more realistic idea of man and his job is materialising. The workers' movement itself has never quite known whether to regard labour as a curse or a blessing. The realisation that the regular rhythm of work itself is essential to a balanced life did not dawn upon it for a long time. The struggle against long and tiring working hours made the movement sceptical about a zest for work and pride of job. It thought that such feelings could be felt only after industry had become the property of the people. The same applied to the relationship between the workers themselves and between the workers and management. This too could never be regulated satisfactorily in a society based on "exploitation".

Actually this proved to be armchair science. Industrial sociology and psychology have already shown that the standards which the workers really apply are quite different. The question of ownership hardly interests them, but what does matter are such things as the social status of the firm and the job, their family's opinion of their position, how they get on with the foreman, the manager's sense of justice and their personal status amongst their colleagues.

In the light of all this, the improvements which the struggle for emancipation has brought merely touch the surface of the social problem. Working hours, wages and holiday pay create the basis for a satisfactory life, but no more. Even industrial or works councils mean formal recognition only. The further transformation of the business into a real community to which people are proud to belong, in which each member can prove his potentialities and receives his full recognition, requires an approach that strikes much deeper.

It has been the great merit of progressive employers, particularly in America but elsewhere too, that they have given support to industrial psychologists and sociologists in their first entry into this virtually unexplored territory. Private enterprise has led the way and well-managed state enterprises are following after. Thus a real progressive approach sometimes paves the way where many would not have expected it.

Greater prosperity, less inequality of wealth or opportunity and other social reforms are certainly not without their importance. They contribute towards alleviating distress. But happiness depends upon other things. It has been said that only he is happy whose life is properly related to his faith his family and his work. As far as the work is concerned, progressive people have long pinned their faith to the future. Slowly, the more mature view is gaining ground that <u>if</u> happiness can be found in working life, it must be found here and now. The zest people can find in their work, the satisfaction they derive from their own position in their environment, the comradeship of a good team - these things count far more to most people than the stirrings of the outside world.

It is the privilege of industrial sociology to help in reconnoitring the way to human happiness in this field.